I
wrote this essay on Somalia's political recent changes towards the end of 2012.
I publish it here ahead of the Somalia conference in May 2013, in London.
Do
get back to me if you have comments or want a PDF version.
MC.
--
SOMALIA, A NEW ERA
Melissa
Chemam
Mars
2013
© Melissa Chemam
Introduction
The
authorities of the transitional federal government, the TFG, were given by
their Western partners until August 20th 2012 to renew
Somalia’s governing and legislative bodies’ leaders. If the deadline itself was
not respected, as the Prime Minister was actually named in October and the
government formed a few weeks later, the delay still seems quite reasonable and
the challenge seems reached. But despite the readiness to match the Western and
UN demands, Somalia still faces major challenges in terms of national unity,
security and general living standards that keep observers quite alarmed about
the most shattered African state’s future.
This
article will present the process Somalia’s institutions and leaders have been
going through in the past year that conducted the country to enter a new era,
and secondly, will try to list the main risks that lie ahead for Somalia’s
future as a stable nation, despite a turning point and the start of a new hope
for the Horn of Africa’s country.
2012: Year of an unprecedented political selection
process
A political turning point
Somalia has often too quickly been nicknamed as a “failed
state”, as defined in Jean-Germain gros’ essay in the third world quarterly
‘towards a taxonomy of failed states in the new world order: decaying Somalia,
Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti’. (…)
Since
the fall of former dictator Siad Barre, in 1991, and the civil war that
followed, Somalia has since the year 2000 moreover often been mentioned as a
threat by the Western powers - to itself, its neighbours and the wider world.
And in recent years, it has also been marred by the rise of Islamic extremism
as the Al Shabab militias grew in power in Southern Somalia and the
piracy attacks against Western ships off Somalia’s coast multiplied[1].
The country has been without a central government
since 1991, going through conflicts, foreign military interventions and
divisions of the country, from which three main regions have emerged: the
self-declared Republic of Somaliland, the semi-autonomous
[1] For
more details, read UNODC reports (http://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/piracy/index.html) and The Ocean beyond Piracy report (http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf)
state of Puntland, and
south and central Somalia (including the capital, Mogadishu) where the
Transition Federal Government (TFG) was based until August. Before 1991,
Somalia had known twenty years of dictatorship, under the rule of Mohamed Siad
Barre who came to power in 1969, while at the time of its independence in 1960,
Somalia was touted in the former Europeans colonisers as a potential model for
newly independent African nations, when the southern Italian Somalia and northern
British Somaliland merged to form the Somali Republic. The problem started
when, “in the new political order, the south obtained de facto hegemony over
the underdeveloped north”[1], with growing regional rivalries, which started to have an impact on clan
politics. The prestigious Isaaq clan - once the majority in Somaliland—
became a national minority. The Darood clan - once a minor player in the
north - rejoined Darood from the south to form a powerful new entity.
Tension between the clans inducted a fractious parliamentary system, as the
clans aligned themselves with competing political parties.
Regarding its infamous
reputation, it is fair to reckon that Somalia’s recent organisation of a whole
process of renewal of the remaining political leaders and institutions’ heads
is a major step forward, as it becomes the first time Somalis recognise a
legitimate government since 1969, year when dictator Siad Barre came to power.
Yet Somalia still has no
central government holding power over the three presented regions; it still
combines three areas having more or less obtained a form of semi-autonomy,
especially Somaliland and Puntland, on the north-eastern coast. The boundaries
between these territories and the rest of Somalia, ‘South Central’ as it is
often referred to, are blurred, disputed and shifting. Only Mogadishu is
considered under the complete control of the government, its surrounding
regions in central Somalia having been only partially and temporary controlled
by the TFG. And until October 2012, the Southern part of Somalia remained under
the control of Al Shabaab militias. On the social level, Somali politics relies
on various powers including members of the military, elected officials and
clans’ leaders, a key constituent of the Somali society.
Despite this challenging
context, Somalia held its first elections in twenty years this summer 2012. Yet
it was more of a selection process than proper elections. The Transitional Federal
Government, TFG, had to manage to organise sustainable elections, while not
controlling the whole of South Central Somalia, and despite continuing fighting
between the Al Shabab militias and the AMISOM soldiers, the African Union
Mission in Somalia. Creation of the international community, Somalia’s TFG’s
mandate was coming to end this summer, under the statement signed under the
United Nations. According to this timetable, it was given until August 20th to
organise elections and set up a more permanent form of government.
And on September 10th,
Somali newly-chosen MPs met in Mogadishu to elect the country's new president
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in the latest step to end decades of
[1] Somalia: A Country Study, by Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Washington:
GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992.
war. Since that date,
the new President nominated Abdi Farah Shirdon as Prime Minister, and the MPs
unanimously backed the ex-businessman, mid-October, which means that Somalia
now has a new legislative power, a new President and a new government. Somalia's
new Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon unveiled a ten-member Cabinet on Sunday
November 4th, with two female Ministers in the proposed Cabinet, including Fauzia
Yusuf Haji as Foreign minister.
In the meantime, members
of Parliament had been selected through a complex and unique framework in
August, in order to install a new legislative power and to organise an indirect
presidential election in a country where organising polls would still be
impossible. This selection started by the creation of a council of about 800
elders among Somali clans and clan leaders and involved Somali politicians as
international actors and partners. Here is a presentation of the key moments:
*The United Nations
(UN), African Union (AU), and Western members of the international community
(IC) started by considering the TFG’s mission had failed, and then decided to
force the process of change.
*Toward the last days of
December 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the transition
would finally end as planned by the UN in August 2012, despite the TFG’s
requests to postpone it.
*On February 23, 2012, a
one-day international Conference on Somalia thus brought together senior
representatives from over 40 countries and international organisations (such as
the UN, AU, European Union (EU), World Bank, Inter-Governmental Authority for
Development (the East African regional body IGAD), Organisation of Islamic
Conference (OIC) and League of Arab States) in London, along with Somalia’s
Transitional Federal Institutions, the presidents of Somaliland, Puntland,
Galmudug (regional governments of autonomist regions) and representatives of
the largest armed group, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ). Most of those foreign
partners had expressed their desire to stop the TFG’s mandate.
*Somali government
officials met in the Northeastern town of Garowe in February 2012 to discuss
post-transition arrangements. Regional actors and international observers were
also consulted and after extensive deliberations, the conference ended in a
signed agreement between TFG President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Prime Minister
Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Speaker of Parliament Sharif Adan Sharif Hassan, Puntland
President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, Galmudug President Mohamed Ahmed Alim and
Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a representative Khalif Abdulkadir Noor stipulating that a
new 225 member bicameral Parliament would be formed, consisting of an upper
house seating 54 Senators as well as a lower house. Later on, a new President
would be chosen through an indirect election by appointed MPs. Finally, the
Prime minister would be designated by the President, and would, later form a
government by naming a Council of Ministers.
*This process was
baptised the ‘Roadmap for the End of Transition’, following the Road Map
agreement signed in Mogadishu on September 6th 2011[1]. And the proper political renewal process
started early July, when a new Constitution was drafted, not without pain, and
finally approved early August by the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), made
up of 825 prominent Somalis, mainly former elected officials and traditional
elders.
*One of the key moments
of the successive votes was the election of the House Speaker, Mohamed Osman
Jawari, in the last days of August. Former minister in the administration of
Siad Barre, Jawari is from the Rahanweyn clan, which meant that it would be
very unlikely a candidate from his clan could be chosen as President. The
former Speaker, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Adan, running for President among more
than twenty candidates, was consequently almost certainly cast out of the
position, as president is traditionally from a different clan to the Speaker of
Parliament - all those votes respecting the traditional influence of Somali
clans.
As a result, a turning
point of finally emerged, unprecedented, after twenty years of civil war and
therefore lack of central government.
Improvements on the security level
In parallel to this
political renewal process, the security has also improved on the ground in
Somalia. With the joint effort of the AMISOM, the African peacekeeping mission
in Somalia, the Somali army and the Kenyan army, the TFG forces regained power
on the Al Shabab militias in central and southern Somalia. This has brought
Somalia to its most peaceful time since 1991. Somalia's clan-like structure and
complex history of invasions and cultural exchanges with its neighbours created
a much divided society, mostly nomadic and oral, with very unique political
models and religious patterns, which did not survive the end of Siad Barre
holding-together dictatorship.
Foreign powers got
involved in trying to resolve the conflict from 1992 but have later on often
exacerbated the situation. First occurrence, the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF) was a United States-led, United Nations-sanctioned multinational
force which operated in Somalia between 5 December 1992 – 4 May 1993.
A United States initiative (code-named Operation Restore Hope),
UNITAF was charged with carrying out United Nations Security Council
Resolution 794 to create a protected environment in order to conduct the
humanitarian operations needed in the southern part of Somalia. But the US
failed to acknowledge the political dimensions of the situation and Operation
Restore Hope was considered a failure despite some humanitarian success. Another
example: years later, in 2006, when the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took
control of most parts of Somalia,
[1] See the UN document here:http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/110906%20-%20Signed%20statement%20on%20adoption%20of%20the%20Roadmap.pdf
“The USA and its
allies misinterpreted these events”, comments Mary Harper[1], “they mistakenly equated a home-grown form of
political Islam with the international al-Qaeda franchise and, by doing so,
inadvertently advertised the country as a promising new battle front for
jihadists from across the world”. In reality, what happened in
south-central Somalia at that time was that those Sharia courts managed to
provide a form of stability, some safety and a type of justice to the people after
years of chaos due to the civil war and the central administration’s fall in
Mogadishu[2].
The US misinterpretation of the religious movement and
social changes in the mid-2000s encouraged the UIC's fall in 2007 and the rise
of al-Shabab militias representing an accurate threat for the country. In
neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya, leaders have also repeatedly qualified the
Shababs as a threat for the whole region, since the 2000s. According to Harper,
Somalia was then “squeezed into the dominant Western post-9/11 narrative”,
as a general area of dangers for the Western world, especially in the USA. But
in Southern Somalia, the Islamist fighters would not let their country turned
into a field of experimentation for the Western world's so-called War on
Terror.
Compared to the most troubled times, the new
government now sees a more secured era, after the liberation of Mogadishu in
August 2011 and the recent victory of the AMISOM/Kenya forces in the Shabab
stronghold in Kismayo. The new President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is an academic
as well as a civic activist who has worked for several national and international
peace and development organisations, which led many commentators of Somalia’s
political life to praise his election. His victory was moreover highly regarded
by the Somali people who feared the former leaders might manage to keep the
power into their hands. Graduated from the Somali National University in 1981
and Bhopal University in India, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud also worked for the
United Nations children's organisation (Unicef) and co-founded the Somali
Institute of Management and Administration Development in Mogadishu. He speaks
Somali and English and we can underline that he is from the Hawiye clan - one
of Somalia's largest and most influential.
However, as Ken Menkhaus wrote in the September issue
of Foreign Policy, “Mohamud's election does not signal an end to
Somalia's 21 years of state collapse. Nor will it bring a quick end to the
country's systemic political violence. The new president is taking the reins of
a failed government that exercises only nominal control over the capital, Mogadishu,
and faces a real, if diminished, threat from the al Qaeda affiliate al-Shabab.
Even in a best-case outcome, it will take years for the government to extend
and deepen its authority. And
[1] ‘Getting Somalia wrong? Faith, War and
Hope in a Shattered State’ by
Mary Harper, African Arguments (Royal African Society), Zed Books, London
[2] For more read here: http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/4424/sharia-courts-and-military-politics-in-stateless-somalia and “Protracted State Collapse in Somalia: A
Rediagnosis” in Review of African Political Economy (2003) by
Ken Menkhaus
though
it brings to a conclusion Somalia's deeply flawed, eight-year political
transition, Mohamud's new administration must still take on a host of difficult,
unfinished transitional tasks”[1].
Somalia’s
new government still face serious challenges
The new government and institution leaders are
hardly in power that they must already deal with huge challenges.
Constitution’s weaknesses
Somalia started its
political renewal process by drafting a new constitution, which could seem like
a solid step but soon entailed further worrying disputes. After many
disagreements, Constitutional Affairs Minister Abdirahman Hosh Jabril declared
it was “a historic day” – as Somalia “witnessed the completion of a
task that has been worked on for the last eight years”[2].
However, according to
BBC Somalia analyst Mary Harper, the constitution adopted early August “appears
to exist in a parallel universe, a fantasy land, when compared with the reality
on the ground in Somalia”[3].
For example, Harper noted that, in a country where large regions are not under
government control, ensuring universal access to education and ending female
genital mutilation is unlikely to happen any time soon.
Additionally, according to human rights advocate Sadia
Ali Aden, a few corrupt Somali politicians participated with one goal: to
convince the Somali people that “the new constitution was for their
protection, and that it was essential for lasting peace”[4]. Thus the “new constitution was shrouded in
secrecy for some time when it was finally endorsed, several
differing versions were released, creating a state of confused frustration. Dissenters
who dared to question the substance of the new draft, its timing, or the
secrecy surrounding it were met with warnings of being labelled a ‘spoiler’ and
of being referred to the International Criminal Court. All of this has
combined to create a fearful environment that hinders the dialogue necessary to
establish long-term plans for Somali reconciliation.”
In
the end, despite good intentions, contentious issues remain unresolved,
including the allocation of power and resources between the centre and the
regions, this is where ferocious arguments are likely to develop, and possibly
become violent.
[1] Ken Menkhaus, “The Somali Spring”, in Foreign
Policy, September 2012:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/the_somali_spring
[3] Interviewed by the
author from the BBC World Service headquarter in London, UK, on August 20th2012
[4]See column in Think Africa Press’s website : http://thinkafricapress.com/somalia/consequence-crooked-constitution
Lack of federalism
Some examples of local governance give hope for a form
of possible stability for Somalis, as the breaking-away region of Somaliland
shows. But the current situation also emphasises the lack of central order and
the long lost unity inside Somalia, as Somaliland and Puntland remained
excluded from the political selection process voluntarily.
In April 2011, in
Hargeisa, the province’s capital, the Minister of Information of Somaliland
Ahmed Abdi Mohamud explains that this will for independence is rooted in his
region’s history:
“Somaliland was
already different and separated from the rest of Somalia at the independence in
1960 because it was ruled by the British Empire with Southern Somalia was
colonized by the Italians. We have since and are still undergoing through
misunderstandings because we have a different culture and have become a
different people. We could not become the same country again. During the 20
years Somalia was at war, Somaliland had a functional government, a Parliament
with a House of Elders, and was living in peace, organizing democratic
elections and peaceful transition or power. Do you really want our region to
become caught into fighting again like Somali is still going through?”[1]
While the Somaliland
leaders are still showing a strong commitment for independence claims,
semi-autonomous Puntland is still part of Somalia’s political process, even
though it does not have senior leaders represented in the new institutions and
its President has been weakened. As the Somalia’s new Constitution remains
vague of the definition of its federalism, this situation could cause
weaknesses for the new government. The recent discoveries of oil in Puntland
and Somaliland could add some more tensions if the exploration of the crude
were to brought serious revenues.
Clearly, this 2012
political process can also not be called entirely democratic; it does not
measure up with Somalis’ expectations of democracy as very few people were
finally involved to choose an even more narrowed group of elders to select
their new political leaders. And while the goal was also to maintain a form of
traditional and clannish form of leadership it only occurred in a very adapted
way. For instance, some minority clans were represented in this process,
something that would have never happened in accordance with old Somali
traditions.
Humanitarian crisis
The other major threat
to stability and to the new government’s effectiveness is that the country is
still undergoing a serious humanitarian crisis, after the severe 2011 drought,
causing food insecurity and malnutrition. According to OCHA (the UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) deputy humanitarian coordinator in
Mogadishu, Kilian Kleinschmidt, Mogadishu is now liberated and reopen for
business,
[1] Interview conducted in Hargeisa, Somaliland in
April 2011, facilitated by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, a week before the celebration of the 20th anniversary
of self-declared independence of Somaliland
but the humanitarian situation remains critical[1]. On top of food insecurity, Somalia remains a highly
military environment with lots of guns still circulating, even in Mogadishu.
The UN and Western aid organizations are currently increasing their
partnerships with Islamic aid and Turkish assistance in order to improve the
food and health relief distribution on the ground.
Nonetheless, the
humanitarian crisis remains one of the highest challenges the new government
will be very limitedly able to cope with. The aid agency Oxfam recently called
on the humanitarian community to maintain support for Somalia at what it
believes is a “critical moment”[2] because of the danger to see the
international community turning its attention elsewhere. Overall, incomes
were found to be two thirds lower than during a normal Gu season putting
increasing reliance on support from agencies. “The poor rains, combined with
the loss of livestock and income during last year’s drought, have left almost
three quarters of people questioned concerned they will not have enough to eat
over the next four months”, shows the Oxfam report.
Corruption
The impossibility to hold elected officials and civil
servants accountable in Somalia is also a major challenge to the government’s
control. “The committee which selected the Members of the Parliament this
summer had to exclude some candidates who should not be running because of the
very poor human rights records and well-known sensibility to corruption, but
most of these candidates remained on the running list”, explains Laetitia
Bader, from the Human Rights Watch (HRW) bureau in East Africa[3]. The justice system also remains a major weakness for
Somalia’s sustainable stability. Building a proper justice system is an absolute
priority. “The international community is pushing for it and Human Rights
Watch is constantly calling for more accountability, but politics have
different views on the ground; they often choose a short-term peace over a
fearful justice”, underlines Laetitia Bader.
As a BBC report
announced in July 2012[4], a leaked UN report on Somalia has alleged that much
of the money received by the former interim government – the TFG - had been
frittered away: “the allegations of such high-level corruption have shocked
many, with estimates that around 70% of money intended for development and
reconstruction in a country racked by 20 years of war was unaccounted for”.
The government, whose mandate expires next month, dismissed them as
"absolutely and demonstrably false". The 198-page report, published
on the Somalia Report website, makes observers wonder how to change a reality
when numbers of local leaders and MPs are still in power in Somalia despite the
recent change of government.
[1] Interviews conducted in Mogadishu on April 28th
2012, with OCHA at the AMISOM compound and visiting IDPs camps and food
distribution centres
[2] http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2012-10-08/new-survey-somalia-food-crisis-remains-critical-likely-worsen
Security is still a daily challenge
Despite numerous 2012
military victories over al Shabaab and other islamist groups in Somalia by the AMISOM,
the Somali army and the Kenyan intervention, the greatest security challenge remains to secure peace in
the near future and on the long run.
The AMISOM launched its biggest operation against the al
Shabaab islamist militia in Mogadishu, in May 2011. “The offensive started
on May 28 and by October we had about 75 to 80 percent of Pogadishu”,
explained brigadier Paul Lokech, Ugandan contingent commander, in april 2012[1]. “these were crucial areas of the stadium, Bakara
market… Bakara market was the economic hub, the centre of gravity of al Shabab,
where they were collecting revenue”, the AMISOM brigadiers added.
Since august 2011, the city has been considered freed
from the enemy, and the TFG - the transitional federal government - regained
power and started planning the city’s reconstruction. For the first time in 20
years, Mogadishu is declared at peace and starts coming back to life. The end of the military operation
in Mogadishu opened the way for the new political process. Former Prime
Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali was appointed in June 2011 and organised the end
of the transition period: “we are in a critical time. Somalia is moving from
an era of lawlessness and chaos into an era of peace and stability. To reach
there, we have a framework called the roadmap. Somalia has been in a transition
for the last 12 years, we came to the end of that road and not for a
transitional government anymore but a more permanent government”[2]. The then prime minister was already very vocal on the
fight against resilient al Shabab forces: “we gained a lot of territories
from al Shabab in 2011-12 and they are on the run. It is to be consolidated
because people are now aware that they have no Somali agenda; they are foreign
and ideological forces, they want nothing good for the Somali people. If you ask me, I say the Shabab
lost the battle and the war”.
Nonetheless, security remains an issue in Somalia,
especially in the southern part of the country but also and even in the capital[3]. One of the main
threats to the current peace process is the instability in the rest of Somalia
outside Mogadishu. “The more stable situation of Mogadishu has very little
impact on the whole country”, argues Laetitia Bader[4], from the Human Rights Watch bureau in East Africa. “In
Baidoa and Kismayo for instance, in southern Somalia, the security control is
completely independent from the government’s control. The whole
political selection process is a Mogadishu-only-centred process”, argues
Laetitia Bader[5], from the Human Rights Watch bureau
in East Africa. “The political power has unfortunately no control outside
the Villa Somalia […]. Some
[3] Read Ken Menkhaus in Foreign Policy:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/03/somalia_kismayo_al_shabab
Official positions exist like
the district commissioners, but how their work has to be conducted technically
remains an open question”. The movements from town to rural areas remain very
difficult according to the AMISOM and Somali police[1], and state organisations as well as humanitarian aid
have no better access to remote areas than in 2011.
Conclusion
Regarding this turning point events of the year 2012,
it will only be possible to see the newly elected officials reinforce their
power in Somalia if the AMISOM forces remain into place in the country,
assuring some continuing control. While the process of nomination of the
government’s ministers was still under way early November, we can only confirm
that these leaders have high chance to become the most legitimate Somalia had
in decades, a feeling most people share on the ground in Somalia and even in
Somaliland. Especially with the election of President Mohamud, the selection
process resulted in a good outcome despite a flowed process. It remains to be
seen how far the new government will extend its control.
