UNICEF ON CAR

Horrific cruelty and violence against children in Central African Republic must end: UNICEF

At least 133 children killed or maimed in past two months

NEW YORK/DAKAR, Senegal, 13 February 2014 – UNICEF officials in the West Africa region said today they are horrified by the cruelty and impunity with which children are being killed and mutilated in the Central African Republic. 

 

According to the UN children’s agency, recent weeks have witnessed unprecedented levels of violence against children in sectarian and retaliatory attacks by anti-Balaka militia and ex-Séléka combatants – acts that constitute grave violations against children.

 

“Children are increasingly targeted because of their religion, or because of their community,” said UNICEF West and Central Africa Regional Director, Manuel Fontaine. “Sectarian violence in Central African Republic has intensified, both in the capital Bangui, and in the west and centre of the country.”  

 

At least 133 children have been killed and maimed, some of them in horrific ways, in two months of escalating ethno-religious violence. UNICEF has verified cases of children intentionally beheaded and mutilated, and is aware of cases of children wounded in the cross-fire, who have had to have limbs amputated because insecurity blocked them from getting to the hospital in time for treatment. In the town of Boali, northwest of the capital, one in four casualties has been among children, with 22 killed and 42 injured since early December. 

 

While violence has been committed by all groups, the most recent targeting of Muslim populations has resulted in the evacuation of whole communities and a significant increase in the number of unaccompanied children, separated from their families in the upheaval. These children are particularly at risk.

 

UNICEF is appealing to government, community, religious and civil society leaders invested with the trust of their communities to help end this violence and to work together towards reconciliation. 

 

“There is no future for a country where adults can viciously target innocent children with impunity”, Fontaine added.  “All children in the Central African Republic must be protected.”

 

UNICEF said that in addition, grave violations against children must be investigated, prosecuted and punished.

• Armed groups and militia in the country must be disarmed immediately.

• Impartial humanitarian assistance must be able to reach children most at risk.

• Security must be restored by national forces, African Union forces and French troops so families can return to their homes. 

• Reconciliation must be nurtured. The transitional government, civil society, religious and youth organisations need to work together to tip the balance from fear towards reconciliation.

 

“Attacks against children must be denounced systematically by civil society, the transitional government, international organizations, and the media,” Fontaine concluded. “Impunity must end.”

Note to editors

With now more than 150 staff on the ground, UNICEF has considerably and rapidly scaled up its humanitarian presence/operations in CAR to be able to adequately respond to the growing magnitude and severity of this crisis. UNICEF is strengthening its field presence by adding staff in established field offices in Bossangoa, Bambari and Kaga Bandoro as well as coordinating outreach strategies in the west and centre of the country.

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About UNICEF

UNICEF promotes the rights and wellbeing of every child, in everything we do. Together with our partners, we work in 190 countries and territories to translate that commitment into practical action, focusing special effort on reaching the most vulnerable and excluded children, to the benefit of all children, everywhere. For more information about UNICEF and its work visit: www.unicef.org

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Sangaris in C.A.R.: "The reluctant interventionist", according to Africa analyst Vincent Darracq (AJE)

OPINION

France in Central Africa: The reluctant interventionist

Why France did not want to be dragged into the conflict in the Central African Republic. Last updated: 11 Feb 2014 09:23

Vincent Darracq Vincent Darracq is an Africa analyst. He works for various risk consultancies and think tanks, including the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI).

France deployed troops in CAR after violence erupted between rebel groups [AFP/Getty Images]

Two months after the beginning of military operation of French troops in the Central African Republic, it is time to debunk a few myths. France's military intervention has raised eyebrows, both in and outside France, for reasons which, interestingly, are opposite. On the one hand, some African elites are, as usual, suspicious of France's alleged sinister intentions and contend that France is a neocolonial power intervening in CAR to protect some mysterious - and largely undefined - political and economic interests. But on the other side, opinion polls in France indicate that a majority of French citizens are opposed to France's deployment in CAR precisely because they can't figure out why France has got involved in the CAR conflict, given how little the country matters to France. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Let's be clear: France has no economic positions or business interests to defend in CAR. Similarly, as opposed to Mali where the takeover of the country by Islamist militants would have presented France with a significant security challenge, France has no direct security or strategic interests to protect in CAR. France has intervened in CAR because the ever deteriorating security situation was becoming a direct threat to the existence of CAR as a state.The collapse of CAR would have been a latent threat to regional stability in Central Africa by providing rebels and militants from neighbouring countries (Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, DRC, Uganda) with a safe haven right in the middle of the continent. There wouldn't have been a single power in the world - whether western or eastern - rejoicing at such a horrific prospect. Also having a 1,600-troop-force deployed in CAR is a financial burden that France would easily live without given its stretched finances. But France's intervention testifies to the weakness of African regional organisations and to their political and military incapacity to handle large-scale security crises in the continent. Like in Mali, France had to intervene at the last minute, because African regional organisations, paralysed by leadership rivalries and lack of capability, proved unable to do the job effectively. CAR:  France is sometimes accused of being biased in the CAR conflict, in favour of the Christian anti-balaka militias supported by former President Francois Bozize against the largely Muslim Seleka coalition. Those holding such views assert that French troops are much more determined at disarming Seleka fighters than they are at doing the same with the anti-balaka. This claim is slightly disingenuous. One has to admit it has been easier to identify and disarm Seleka, a more formalised force made of fighters hanging around in their pickups with their machine guns and sleeping in military barracks, than the more elusive anti-balaka militias. It is worth reminding that when Seleka marched into Bangui and overthrew Bozize in March 2013, French troops in Bangui did not move, despite Bozize desperately calling Paris for help. Has the French intervention been a success? Well, it was clearly too little, too late. French and African MISCA troops have finally managed to restore a degree of order in Bangui, though localised inter-community violence can flare up anytime. But persistent tensions in Bangui mean that most French troops have been forced to stay in the capital and have not been able to deploy to the countryside, as planned initially, and levels of violence in rural areas, committed either by the anti-balaka or Seleka, are just scary. By its own admission[Fr], the French government clearly underestimated the difficulty of the task at hand in CAR. Unlike in Mali, where there was a clearly-identified enemy, there wasn't anybody to fight against, and to disarm random groups of fighters in urban areas is not what a conventional army is usually prepared for. Clearly, French authorities had also overestimated the level of inter-religious animosity, as well as the rise of the anti-balaka. So, as the French defence minister just said[Fr], French troops will probably have to stay for longer than their initial six-month mandate. The European Union (EU) has pledged to send 500 troops in support of France, but given its EU partners' reluctance to commit troops, there is a significant chance that France will provide about half of the 500 fighters. In any case, the number of EU troops will be too small to have a major impact on the security situation. The solution would probably be a United Nations' peace-keeping operation, numbering about 10,000 troops. The African Union (AU) and Russia are opposed to this option - the AU wants to keep the upper hand on handling the crisis, and as a matter of principle, Russia hates international interference. However, the UN operation option is likely to win, and a UN force will probably be deployed in about six months. It is not sure that such a deployment will make a significant impact, especially if the force comprises troops from faraway countries with feeble rules of engagement. But without such a force, here is the likely prospect for CAR in the medium term: A de-facto division of the country, with the government controlling Bangui and a few main provincial cities with the help of French and African troops, the west controlled by the anti-balaka and the north-east as Seleka's rear base. There will be endless chaos. It is time for the international community to make a move. Vincent Darracq is an Africa analyst. He works for various risk consultancies and think tanks, including the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI). The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy. Source: Al Jazeera

Central African Republic: More on the defence militias anti-balaka

From IRIN, the UN humanitarian news agency:

Briefing: Who are the anti-balaka of CAR?

Photo: Till Muellenmeister/IRIN

Anti Balaka fighters at Bangui´s estate PK9, waiting to attack Muslim IDPs convoys passing along the road

BANGUI, 12 February 2014 (IRIN) - On 10 February, Gen Francisco Soriano, commander of Sangaris, the French peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), condemned the anti-balaka militia as the main enemy of peace in the country, and vowed that the mission would concentrate its efforts against them. His statement came just before Amnesty International charged international peacekeepers with having failed to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Muslim civilians in western CAR.

This IRIN briefing looks at the threat posed by the anti-balaka to Muslims and to the CAR population in general. 
 
Who are the anti-balaka?
 
In Soriano’s words: “We don’t know”.

Their leaders’ identity, their chain of command and their political programme are all unknowns, he told a meeting of community representatives in Bangui. At the same meeting, his African Union counterpart, Cameroonian Gen Martin Tumenta (commanding MISCA, the AU mission in CAR), expressed frustration that Bangui’s citizens have not been providing the force with more information about the anti-balaka.

An audience member’s claim that calls to a MISCA hotline number tend to go unanswered prompted an angry response from Tumenta. “So you’re calling us useless?” he said before walking out of the meeting.
 
“Balaka” is the Sango word for machete. Some sources say it is also alludes to the French for bullets of an automatic rifle (“balle AK”). Either way, “anti-balaka” roughly means “invincible”, a power purportedly bestowed by the charms that hang around the necks of most members. The term gained currency five or six years ago, when it was applied to self-defence units set up - in the absence of effective state security forces - to protect communities from attacks by highway bandits or cattle raiders. 
 
Several rebel groups joined forces under the banner of the Seleka (“alliance” in Sango) forces in late 2012, and seized power the following March. “Anti-balaka” caught on as a generic term for those resisting the brutal Seleka (a word to which, since the alliance’s official disbanding in September 2013, the prefix “ex” has usually added).
 
Clashes in December 2013 between anti-balaka and the ex-Seleka led to reprisal attacks in which about 1,000 people died in Bangui. The anti-balaka have been largely responsible for driving the ex-Seleka from many of their bases in western CAR. 
  
What is the religious connection? 
Most Seleka members were Muslim, chiefly because Islam is the more prevalent religion in the marginalized northern areas where rebel groups sprang up. Seleka members committed widespread atrocities after seizing power in March 2013, including killings, large-scale arson and rape.

More recently Muslims, many with no connection to the rebels, have been targeted in reprisals by anti-balaka and civilians. According to Amnesty International, such attacks have led tens of thousands to leave CAR in “an exodus of historic proportions”. 
 
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), “the anti-balaka militias are increasingly organized and using language that suggests their intent is to eliminate Muslim residents from the Central African Republic.”
 
“At this rate, if the targeted violence continues, there will be no Muslims left in much of the Central African Republic,” Peter Bouckaert, emergencies director at Human Rights Watch, said in an emailed statement. 
 
“People whose families have peacefully lived in the country for centuries are being forced to leave, or are fleeing the very real threat of violence against them.” 
 
A self-styled spokesman for the anti-balaka, Sebastien Wenezoui, has said that the movement is fighting to defend Christians. Most of its recruits are from Christian or animist communities. But Christian and Muslim leaders have insisted that the neither anti-balaka nor ex-Seleka can credibly claim to represent either faith.
 
What are the anti-balaka’s links with the army? 
After the coup, many members of the former government army, known by its French acronym, FACA, joined the anti-balaka. In the prefecture of Lobaye, all anti-balaka commanders there came from FACA, residents told IRIN.
 

People whose families have peacefully lived in the country for centuries are being forced to leave, or are fleeing the very real threat of violence against them 

On 14 January, a few days after post-coup president Michel Djotodia stepped down, hundreds of men, many of whom had fought as anti-balaka, showed up for duty at FACA headquarters. Hundreds more have since appeared at morning assemblies. How many of them were bona fide soldiers before the coup, and how many still consider themselves members of anti-balaka, is not clear. 
 
Anti-balaka spokesmen have called for members to be integrated into the army “with appropriate rank” or given demobilization packages.
 
Earlier this month, minutes after newly installed interim president, Catherine Samba-Panza, addressed an inaugural parade of re-launched FACA, a dozen of them set on a suspected ex-Seleka in their midst and kicked him to death, in full view of international media. No arrests have been made. 
 
In Lobaye, the anti-balaka - many wearing military uniforms but without FACA insignia - man roadblocks beside gendarmes. Amnesty International reports that the anti-balaka occupy FACA barracks in parts of the country. Asked what they think about the anti-balaka, a group of FACA soldier told IRIN: “They are our brothers. We are together against the Seleka.” 
 
What is the structure of anti-balaka? 
They are said to consist of many groups, including at least 10 in Bangui, based on the city’s arrondissements, and many others across the country. There have been no reports of anti-balaka groups fighting each other.

Two ministers in the government of ousted president Francois Bozize, Patrice Edouard Ngaissona and Joachin Kokate, claim to be the anti-balaka’s national-level political and military coordinators, respectively. Bozize has denied having a controlling hand over the group.
 
Ngaissona returned to Bangui from exile in December 2013 and has since upstaged Kokate in the media. Both he and Ngaissona have told media that the “token” anti-balaka representative in the new government, Leopold Narcisse Mbara, minister for youth and sport, was not the movement’s choice. 

Following the condemnation of anti-balaka by Soriano, Ngaissona said the movement is committed “to pacification and normalization in CAR”.
 
What threat do they pose to the population? 
According to HRW, the anti-balaka are targeting Muslims in “a relentless wave of coordinated violence that is forcing entire communities to leave the country.”
 
HRW and Amnesty International have both documented atrocities, including five massacres in western CAR last month, in which at least 180 Muslim civilians were killed, as well as other killings in Bangui. 
 

Photo: Till Muellenmeister/IRIN

Youth at Bangui´s estate PK9, throwing stones at a convoy of Chadian IDPs trying to flee the country

“In Bangui, anti-balaka fighters, armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and grenades attacked numerous Muslim areas, forcing the population to flee,” the HRW statement said.
 
“PK12, PK13, Miskine, and Kilo 5 - all former Muslim strongholds in Bangui - are now ghost towns, devoid of Muslim residents. Some anti-balaka militants have told Human Rights Watch that they would kill any Muslims remaining in these neighbourhoods.”
 
“Whether the anti-balaka leaders are pursuing a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing or exacting abusive collective punishment against the Muslim population [in response to the Seleka’s atrocities], the end result is clear: the disappearance of longstanding Muslim communities,” HRW’s Bouckaert said.
 
In the town of Mbaiki, one anti-balaka leader told IRIN that young people with appropriate skills would be selected to take over shops abandoned by Muslims.

According to aid workers, most main roads in the west of the country are controlled by anti-balaka. Hundreds of aid-delivery trucks remain stuck at the Cameroonian border, their drivers too scared to proceed into CAR, where food security is seriously under threat. 
 
What are Sangaris’ and MISCA’s strategies?  
The peacekeepers are deploying more widely, but currently the French presence outside Bangui is limited to a few towns. The 1,600-strong mission says it has units at Bossangoa, Berberati, Yaloke, Boda and Mbaiki in the west (although none were at Mbaiki on 9 February) and at Bambari and Ndele in the east. MISCA has deployed nearly half its 5,500 troops and police outside Bangui, mainly in western CAR.

Both Soriano and Tumenta dismissed suggestions at the 10 February meeting that they should negotiate with the anti-balaka. But the signs are that they are not yet waging an all-out war on the movement. Aid workers report an overall lessening of tension in Bangui in the past 10 days, with some targeted killings but fewer firefights. 
 
Comments by community leaders at the 10 February meeting suggested they would prefer the peacekeepers concentrate on disarming the residual Muslim parts of town, a few small enclaves. Then people would return from the vast displacement camp at the airport, it was argued.

Nothing was said of the Muslims’ fate. Soriano argued that disarmament is happening little by little and spoke of 4,000 traditional weapons, 300 hunting rifles and many grenades collected. 
 
One speaker asked who would guarantee her security if she informed on the anti-balaka. No speaker, apart from religious leaders, denounced anti-balaka abuses.
 
What is the government’s attitude? 
President Samba-Panza has resisted pressure from the anti-balaka to include them in government, apart from the sport minister. By contrast she has included three ex-Seleka ministers in her 20-person cabinet.

In her public addresses, she has spoken openly of the need to lay down machetes and other weapons and for communities to live in harmony. But she also said that not all the anti-balaka and not all the ex-Seleka are rogues. 
 
Asked about the government’s policy for demobilizing the anti-balaka, a defence ministry source said the sports minister would ask them to comply.
 
The president has called on the international community to help CAR reconstitute its security forces. So far, France has agreed to pay for 150 gendarmes, recommended by the government, who will be armed and will collaborate with the peacekeepers.

Soriano said the government needs to draw up a list of the “real” FACA before the international community can consider paying them. The FACA was increasingly dominated by members of Bozize’s ethnic group, and the government may wish to redress that bias.
 
nl/am/rz
 

Rwanda - suivi du procès français: point de vue de Survie

Procès Simbikangwa :

Un ancien militaire français témoigne aux côtés du présumé génocidaire rwandais et défend la thèse d’un « double génocide »

Paris, 12 février 2014 - Survie, partie civile dans le procès de Pascal Simbikangwa, revient sur l’audition, ce mardi 11 février, du Colonel Michel Robardey.

Les avocats de la défense de Pascal Simbikangwa, jugé depuis le 4 février à Paris pour complicité de génocide, ont appelé à titre de « témoin de contexte » le colonel Michel Robardey, officier français présent au Rwanda de 1990 à 1993 avec le grade de commandant puis lieutenant-colonel, qui y dirige le programme de formation des officiers de police judiciaire (OPJ).

Le Colonel Robardey est chargé de réorganiser le fichier central : la section de recherche et de documentation criminelle (CRCD), lieu de torture où aurait sévi le capitaine Simbikangwa, qui travaillait à l’époque au service des renseignements. Alors que les avocats de la partie civile s’interrogent sur sa connaissance ou non d’actes de torture alors qu’il parle de « culture de l’aveu » et du fait qu’avant son arrivée « Ils n'avaient pas été formés et se laissaient aller à ces facilités», le Colonel Robardey parle de la torture comme d’une « affaire mineure » car « en temps de guerre ». Repris, il ajoute : « ce n’est pas mineur, mais je n’avais pas les moyens d’enquêter »[…] « On n’avait pas le temps ». Le Colonel Robardey, à plusieurs reprises, semble suggérer que toutes les enquêtes des militaires français sur place portaient sur le FPR et jamais sur l’Etat rwandais. Ainsi, il avoue n’avoir jamais cherché à enquêter sur la constitution en 1992 d’un service de renseignements parallèle au seul service de la Présidence rwandaise.

Le Colonel Robardey est un témoin de contexte, mais appelé par la défense, il la sert, défendant« l’Etat rwandais, avec lequel je collaborais ». Sa description du contexte rejoint en bien des points celle du Capitaine Simbikangwa. Comme lui, il évoque une montée de tension et des violences qui ne seraient qu’une réaction aux actes de guérilla du FPR et aux crimes perpétrés au Burundi voisin (contre des dirigeants Hutu). Il insiste sur la confusion, la peur, l’ « injustice », désignant implicitement le FPR comme l’ennemi et les Tutsi comme les complices, niant ainsi la préméditation et la planification du génocide.

Ainsi, bien que ne niant pas le génocide des Tutsi, Robardey mentionne les « massacres de Tutsi » : « Les chiffres des massacres commis par les uns et les autres entre 90 et 94 n’ont pas été vérifiés sur le terrain » ; « Tous les chiffres cités à propos des massacres au Rwanda sont invérifiables».

Robardey affirme que « si tout cela s’est fait, ce n’était pas organisé ». Il a également suggéré « je sais c’est difficile à croire, mais la thèse du génocide spontané n’est pas totalement stupide. En tout cas ce n’est certainement pas de manière étatique que les massacres ont été organisés ». Il va ainsi à l'encontre de tout ce qu'ont établi les experts de l'ONU, le Tribunal Pénal International, ou en France le Conseil d'Etat et les services de renseignement. 

Plus tard, il ajoute « Le génocide, je l’ai empêché pendant trois ans », sans expliquer comment, indiquant simplement que la présence de la France dans le cadre de l’opération Noroit aurait retardé les massacres. Finissant son intervention par des propos alimentant la thèse négationniste du « double génocide », exprimés comme un « bémol » : « Mais j’aimerais savoir pourquoi quand un Tutsi est tué, c’est un génocide, alors que quand un Hutu est tué, c’est un crime de guerre. Il faudrait revoir la qualification juridique de ces crimes ». Robardey s’inscrit dans la lignée de militaires, politiques  et essayistes français qui en défendant l’existence d’un supposé génocide des Hutu par des Tutsi relativisent le seul génocide ayant été perpétré, celui des Tutsi au Rwanda, et la complicité des autorités françaises dans ce crime.

L’association Survie, partie civile dans ce procès comme dans une dizaine d’autres affaires à l’encontre de présumés génocidaires installés en France et de militaires et mercenaires français accusés de complicité de génocide, s’interroge : pourquoi ces officiers français qui ont servi au Rwanda viennent-ils défendre des présumés génocidaires, devant la justice française comme devant le TPIR, et non les victimes ? Ainsi, le Général Lafourcade, venu défendre Théoneste Bagosora, inculpé devant le TPIR pour génocide, complicité de génocide, incitation publique et directe à commettre le génocide et crime contre l’humanité, s’était justifié: « C’était un geste d’humanité. Il avait droit à une défense équitable ».

Survie, en tant que partie civile au procès de Pascal Simbikangwa, est représentée par Maitre Jean Simon, avocat à la Cour. Le procès devrait se prolonger au moins jusqu’à mi-mars.

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On CAR situation: Chatham House

Stuck on the Edge of the Periphery in the CAR

Ben Shepherd, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme  Western countries and traditional donors have little stake in the sectarian crisis in the Central African Republic. The country has a capable interim president, but without outside support, the population is unlikely to see a respite in the conflict any time soon. The crisis in the Central African Republic continues to simmer. Sectarian violence between the Christian majority and Muslim communities intensified during the short-lived rule of the Islamic Seleka rebel coalition in 2013, and has gathered pace since. More than a million people have been displaced. Numerous killings and large-scale massacres have been reported, with many blamed on Christian militias known as ‘anti-Balaka’. Initially organized to protect communities from banditry, they resisted the Seleka and are now seemingly seeking revenge. The Seleka has since disintegrated. Its leader, Michael Djotodia, resigned his short and ill-starred presidency in January, and foreign fighters – including a substantial number from neighbouring Chad – fled the country. Others are protected by peacekeeping troops. CAR’s remaining Muslim communities feel under acute threat, and there are warnings of widespread ethnic cleansing – even parallels with Rwanda before 1994. Read full comment online>>

Sur les violences en RCA : Amnesty International

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

République centrafricaine. Nettoyage ethnique et violences interreligieuses

Les soldats de la force internationale de maintien de la paix ne parviennent pas à empêcher le nettoyage ethnique des civils musulmans dans l’ouest de la République centrafricaine, écrit Amnesty International dans le rapport qu’elle publie mercredi 12 février 2014.

Afin de protéger les communautés musulmanes encore présentes dans le pays, les soldats de la paix doivent faire barrage au contrôle des milices anti-balaka et déployer des troupes en nombre suffisant dans les villes où les musulmans sont menacés.

« Les milices anti-balaka mènent des attaques violentes dans le but de procéder au nettoyage ethnique des musulmans en République centrafricaine », a déclaré Joanne Mariner, conseillère d’Amnesty International pour les situations de crise.

« Résultat, on assiste à un exode des musulmans sans précédent. »

Amnesty International a critiqué la réponse trop timorée de la communauté internationale, en notant que les troupes internationales de maintien de la paix se montrent réticentes à faire face aux milices anti-balaka et ne sont pas assez réactives pour protéger la minorité musulmane menacée.

« Les troupes internationales de maintien de la paix n’ont pas réussi à stopper la violence, a déclaré Donatella Rovera, conseillère d’Amnesty International pour les situations de crise. Elles y ont consenti dans certains cas, en laissant les milices anti-balaka remplir au niveau du pouvoir le vide créé par le départ de la Séléka. »

Au cours des dernières semaines, Amnesty International a recueilli plus d’une centaine de témoignages de première main sur les attaques de grande ampleur menées par les anti-balaka contre des civils musulmans dans les villes de Bouali, Boyali, Bossembélé, Bossemptélé et Baoro, dans le nord-ouest de la République centrafricaine. Les troupes internationales n’étaient pas déployées dans ces villes, laissant les civils sans protection.

L’attaque la plus meurtrière répertoriée par Amnesty International s’est déroulée le 18 janvier à Bossemptélé. Elle a fait plus de 100 victimes parmi la population musulmane, dont des femmes et des vieillards, notamment un imam d’environ 75 ans.

Pour échapper à la folie meurtrière des anti-balaka, dans de nombreuses villes et de nombreux villages, toute la population musulmane a fui, tandis qu’ailleurs, ceux qui restent se réfugient à l’intérieur et aux abords des églises et des mosquées.

L’inquiétude de la communauté internationale face aux violences à caractère religieux en République centrafricaine a amené le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU à autoriser, en décembre 2013, le déploiement des forces de maintien de la paix dans le pays. Ces forces, composées de 5 500 soldats de l’Union africaine, la MISCA, et de 1 600 soldats français, l’opération « Sangaris », se trouvent à Bangui et dans plusieurs villes au nord et au sud-ouest de la capitale.

Même dans le quartier musulman du PK-5 situé au centre de Bangui, des milliers d’habitants effrayés font leurs valises et quittent leur foyer.

Pour se mettre à l’abri, le périple est difficile et dangereux. Les convois sont fréquemment pris pour cibles par les milices anti-balaka.

Un petit garçon appelé Abdul Rahman a raconté à Amnesty International que, le 14 janvier, le camion à bord duquel il voyageait avait été stoppé à un poste de contrôle tenu par les anti-balaka. Ils ont exigé que tous les passagers musulmans descendent. Six membres de sa famille ont alors été tués : trois femmes et trois jeunes enfants, dont un bébé.

La violence, la haine et l’instabilité sont une conséquence directe de la crise des droits humains qui a débuté en décembre 2012, lorsque la Séléka, très majoritairement musulmane, a lancé une offensive armée qui s’est terminée par la prise du pouvoir en mars 2013. À la tête du pays pendant près de 10 mois, les forces de la Séléka ont commis des massacres, des exécutions extrajudiciaires, des viols, des actes de torture et des pillages, et ont incendié et détruit de nombreux villages chrétiens.

Lorsque la Séléka s’est retirée, les forces internationales ont laissé les milices anti-balaka prendre le contrôle du pays, ville après ville. Les violences et l’expulsion forcée des communautés musulmanes étaient prévisibles.

Le pouvoir déclinant des forces de la Séléka n’a en rien diminué leur brutalité lorsqu’elles se sont retirées. Même avec une capacité de mouvement et des moyens opérationnels fortement entravés, les membres de la Séléka ont poursuivi les attaques violentes contre les civils chrétiens et leurs biens. Des membres armés de communautés musulmanes, agissant indépendamment ou aux côtés de la Séléka, se sont également livrés à des attaques de grande ampleur contre des civils chrétiens.

« L’urgence de la situation exige une réponse immédiate, a déclaré Joanne Mariner. Il est temps que l’opération de maintien de la paix en République centrafricaine protège la population civile, se déploie dans les zones à risques et stoppe cet exode massif. »

Etre citoyen français, être étranger, c'est quoi?

Abdel-Malik Djermoune, fondateur du Parti de la Banlieue :

"Au XIXe siècle, on pensait aussi que les Bretons avaient notre problématique, qu'ils ne pourraient jamais s'intégrer en France... Ca nous paraît aberrant aujourd'hui, mais c'est vrai. Ils gardent leurs spécificités, on le voit avec les 'Bonnets rouges', mais meme dans leur différence, ils font la France d'aujourd'hui, un ensemble qui fait nation". 

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Lien : http://lepartidelabanlieue.fr/parti-de-la-banlieue/

Essai : 'Les Afriques cobayes', de Martine Camacho

	Les Afriques cobayes  40 ans de développement du sous-développement par Martine Camacho Sociologue de formation, Martine Camacho, après une douzaine d'années dans l'enseignement supérieur en Afrique, est revenue au journalisme, une passion d'adolescence puis, en 1988, est tombée dans le chaudron du Système des Nations Unies au service de la Communication pour la Santé. Plus de 20 ans d'engagement sincère et enthousiaste à lutter sur des projets en faveur de la planification familiale, de la réduction de la malnutrition, de la prévention du VIH/SIDA. Plus de 20 ans à côtoyer, de l'intérieur, les logiques des "développeurs patentés" des Nations Unies, de la Banque Mondiale et de l'Union Européenne. Une expérience passionnante et éprouvante à la fois, riche de frustrations et de révolte contre des systèmes d'aide au développement qui entendent imposer des modèles inappropriés. Des organisations bi ou multi -latérales qui collectionnent les incohérences, les pesanteurs, les contradictions et pour lesquelles la propre reproduction du système l'emporte sur l'objectif d'un développement durable et choisi.  L'auteure dans un style vivant et humoristique démonte les logiques de développement du sous-développement qui sont en fait à l'oeuvre en Afrique mais conserve son optimiste sur la capacité du continent à résister aux expériences socio-économiques des apprentis sorciers du développement. L'Afrique, comme l'Asie, constitue le continent montant de demain pour peu qu'on lui laisse le temps et le choix de mûrir ses propres modèles de société.
	388 pages - ISBN : 9782342012521 - Essais

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Le site de l'éditeur : http://www.monpetitediteur.com/librairie/livre.php?isbn=9782342012521

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Ecoutez Martine Camacho en interview sur RFI :

http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20131207-afriques-cobayes-40-ans-developpement-martine-camacho

Livre international

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SAMEDI 07 DÉCEMBRE 2013

«Les Afriques cobayes, 40 ans de développement du sous-développement», de Martine Camacho

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Par Jean-Jacques Louarn

Aujourd'hui dans Livre international, nous vous recevons Martine Camacho qui vient de signer Les Afriques cobayes, 40 ans de développement du sous-développement, un essai publié par Mon petit éditeur.

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